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The persistent effect of competition on prosociality

Kosse, Fabian; Rajan, Ranjita; Tincani, Michela M. - 2023

We present the first causal evidence on the persistent impact of enduring competition on prosociality. Inspired by the literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we explore if enduring exposure to a competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493908

The self selection of migrant workers revisited

Yashiv, Eran (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002396365

Labor turnover, wage structures, and moral hazard : the inefficiency of competitive markets

Arnott, Richard - 1982

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001790970

Hours risk and wage risk : repercussions over the life-cycle

Jessen, Robin; König, Johannes - 2020

We decompose permanent earnings risk into contributions from hours and wage shocks. To distinguish between hours shocks …-cycle model of consumption and labor supply. Both permanent wage and hours shocks are important to explain earnings risk, but wage … shocks have greater relevance. Progressive taxation strongly attenuates cross-sectional earnings risk, its life …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012145317

The welfare economics of moral hazard

Arnott, Richard; Stiglitz, Joseph - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003474097

Microfounded contest design

Kirkegaard, René - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012172857

Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2022

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458796

Subjective evaluation versus public information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013

This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934

Misappropriation of R&D subsidies : estimating treatment effects with one-sided noncompliance

Boeing, Philipp; Peters, Bettina - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818352

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