Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013193845
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111150
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015051212
value the collective reputation of their institution, e.g. due to a prosocial signaling motive or identity concerns. The … initial insight of the analysis is that there exists both a highreputation, low-wage equilibrium and a low-reputation, high …-wage equilibrium. Importantly, the comparative statics of motivation and wage differ between the equilibria: starting from low-reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281179
, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high … and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution …, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011552475
attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral industrial organization that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498486
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003528215
attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral IO that assume that … eine Reputation für die Qualität ihrer Produkte erwerben können ('experience goods'). Dabei vergleichen wir den … endogen ergeben, mindert Preiswettbewerb die Effizienz, da die Konsumenten der Reputation der Verkäufer hinsichtlich der …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010188722
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269