Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....

This study provides empirical evidence for the economic rationality of wage rigidities. Theoretically wage rigidities can result from contracts, implicit contracts, from efficiency wages and from insider-outsider behaviour. Based on a survey of 801 firms strong support has been found for...

Gerlach and Stephan (1994) proposed a test based on the idea that the wage premium, the part of the wage which is not explained by the stock of human capital, should help predict variables such as career expectations (quit, change occupation, leave the labour force) and some job characteristics...

Can a firm increase its workers' eff ort by introducing competition through performance-based ranking? On one hand such ranking can increase eff ort because of individuals' desire for status from high ranks, but on the other, it can demotivate them or make them wary of outperforming peers. This...

The positive role of transformational leadership on productivity and mental wellbeing has long been established. Transformational leadership behavior may be particularly suited to navigate times of crisis which are characterized by high levels of complexity and uncertainty. We exploit...

This paper analyzes the influence of the structure of collective wage bargaining on direct investment abroad. A wage negotiations model shows that high productive firms benefit from centralized bargaining and invest therefore less abroad than under dezentralized bargaining. An empirical study...

Employee resistance against innovations is a virulent phenomenon and there is a broad theoretical literature on its determinants. The empirical evidence is scarce, however, and mainly provides descriptive evidence on the incidence of the phenomenon and concentrates on the effectiveness of change...

We solve the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where vacancies and unemployed workers can meet either in an intermediated market where wages are determined by take-it-orleave- it offers, or in a directed search market where firms post wages. By using an intermediary agents avoid the...

This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...