This paper investigates the usefulness of non-choice data, namely response times, as a predictor of threshold behavior in a simple global game experiment. Our results indicate that the signal associated to the highest or second highest response time at the beginning of the experiment are both...

We study farsighted stability under the assumption that coalitions may condition actions on the history of the play. vNM stable set over possible play paths is defined with respect to the indirect dominance relation. We show that such dynamic stable set always exists. It is characterized by a...

We study a dynamic vNM stable set in a compact metric space under the assumption of complete and continuous dominance relation. Internal and external stability are defined with respect to farsighted dominance. Stability of an outcome is conditioned on the history via which it is reached. A...

We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework a la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move....

We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed....

We develop an operational model of information contagion and show how it may be integrated into a mainstream, top-down, stress-testing framework to quantify systemic risk. The key transmission mechanism is a two-way interaction between the beliefs of secondary market investors and the...

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments ask participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and...

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring...

We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and...

Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's...