We solve the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where vacancies and unemployed workers can meet either in an intermediated market where wages are determined by take-it-orleave- it offers, or in a directed search market where firms post wages. By using an intermediary agents avoid the...

We study the effects of different tax reporting mechanisms in experi-mental double auction markets in the laboratory. The sales tax is paidby the seller, and we compare market outcomes in a no-tax conditionto cases where (i) tax evasion is impossible, (ii) taxes can be evaded butthere is an...

I examine a rational expectations model of buyers and capacity con-strained sellers, where traders can choose between a cluster and a searchmarket. Sellers choose a market and post a price, and then buyerschoose which market to visit. There is a pure strategy equilibriumwhere all agents are in...

We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for expe-rience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and...

We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and...

Digitale Technologien begünstigen den Einsatz einer dynamischen Preisgestaltung, also von Preisen, die für ein prinzipiell gleiches Produkt unangekündigt variieren. Dabei werden in der öffentlichen Diskussion unterschiedliche Ausgestaltungsformen dynamischer Preise oftmals vermischt, was...

Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed costs to price discriminate without setting a reference price. Their participatory and innovative...

Firms often set long notice periods when consumers cancel a contract, and sometimes do so even when the costs of changing or canceling the contract are small. We investigate a model in which a firm offers a contract to consumers who may procrastinate canceling it due to naive present-bias. We...

Using transaction-level data on foreign exchange (FX) forward contracts, we document large demand-driven heterogeneity in banks' dollar hedging costs. For identification, we exploit regulatory end-of-quarter reporting that penalizes banks' currency exposure with capital surcharges. Contracts...

Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyze the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides a contract with automatic...