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An implementation approach to rotation programs
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021
We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013394373
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An implementation approach to rotation programs
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021
We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012792917
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Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023
Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372
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Matching with waiting times : the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
Dimakopoulos, Philipp; Heller, Christian-Philipp - 2018
efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899159
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Non-standard choice in matching markets
Caspari, Gian; Khanna, Manshu - 2022
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460341
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School choice and loss aversion
Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2019
Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798
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A Differential Approach to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Korpela, Ville - 2012
Numerous simple proofs of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1977, Satterthwaite, 1975) has been given in the literature. These are based on a number of different intuitions about the most fundamental reason for the result. In this paper we derive the Gibbard-Satterthwaite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503028
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Aiding applicants : leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2021
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191426
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Outside options drive wage inequalities in continuing jobs : evidence from a natural experiment
Lukesch, Veronika; Zwick, Thomas - 2021
entropy matching on the basis of a large representative administrative linked employer-employee panel data set to guarantee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421893
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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness
Meisner, Vincent - 2021
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382