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What are the priorities of bureaucrats? : evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials

Tukiainen, Janne; Blesse, Sebastian; Bohne, Albrecht; … - 2021 - This version: March 25, 2021

A well-functioning bureaucracy is a precondition for efficient public goods provision. However, bureaucratic decision-making is still largely seen as a black box. We provide novel insights into the preferences of bureaucrats regarding their work outcomes. We focus on a major public sector...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012492856

You owe me

Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017

In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver’s intention. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590892

Reforming an institutional culture of corruption : a model of motivated agents and collective reputation

Valasek, Justin - 2015

Recent empirical studies suggest that poor public sector performance in developing nations is due in part to the difficultly of selecting workers whose motivation is aligned with the mission of the institution -- in direct contrast to evidence from developed nations, public sector workers tend...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281179

Tax Compliance in the RentalHousing Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Eerola, Essi; Kosonen, Tuomas; Kotakorpi, Kaisa; … - 2019

We study rental income tax compliance using a large-scale randomizedfield experiment and register data with third-party information on theownership of apartments. We analyze the responses of potential land-lords to treatment letters notifying them of stricter tax enforcement. Wealso study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503079

The hidden burden of the income tax : compliance costs of German individuals

Blaufus, Kay; Eichfelder, Sebastian; Hundsdoerfer, Jochen - 2011

We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpyers resulting from the German income tax. using survey data that has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpaxers. Taxable income and the demand for external...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009008047

"Robin Hood in reverse" : persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy

Cavalcante, Pedro - 2021

Despite improvements in the living conditions of the population, there has not been a significant change in income disparities. Since the growth of left-wing parties and political competition as per the median voter hypothesis do not stand in the Brazilian case, what could explain the tenacity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012486184

Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at theEuropean Patent Office

Harhoff, Dietmar; Wagner, Stefan - Universität <München> / Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft - 2006

We analyze the duration of the patent examination process at the EuropeanPatent Office (EPO). Our data contain information related to the patent’seconomic and technical relevance, EPO capacity and workload as well as novelcitation measures which are derived from the EPO’s search reports. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418841

The limits of transparency as a means of reducing corruption

Parra, Daniel; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel; Palacio, Luis - 2019

We use a laboratory experiment to study the impact of transparency on reducing corruption in contexts where … embezzlement and bribery can co-occur. These contexts are closely related to grand corruption settings, where different types of … corruption occur and allow people in power to take advantage of their position. Transparency is expected to have a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134796

Dynamic reform of public institutions : a model of motivated agents and collective reputation

Valasek, Justin - 2016 - Revised October 2016

State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011552475

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310