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Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495059
students' welfare, even if the student-optimal stable matching is consistently chosen. However, on average all students …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241889
The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033869
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460341
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices because they are strategy-proof, in addition to DA's no justified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411288
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495278
the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539
Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798