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This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by … the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency is a proxy of decision-making ability is often based on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014323610
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428398
thereby distort optimal search. In addition, urgency may alter decision-making processes and thereby the salience of regret … systematic adjustments in search length. Urgency reduces decision times and perceived decision quality, but does not generally … alter search length. Only very inexperienced decision-makers buy earlier when pressured. Thus, consumer protection measures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476728
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762571
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
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