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We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such...
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observed by the incumbent and some fraction of informed consumers. This leads to price signalling rivalry between the … outcome. -- Quality uncertainty ; Signalling ; Oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009404774
This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for social image. The market outcome features partial pooling and product differentiation that is not driven by heterogeneous valuations for quality but by image concerns. A...
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The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...
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receiver's inference about their type. We reestablish revenue equivalence when bidders' signaling concerns are linear, and the … auction makes participation observable via an entry fee. With convex signaling concerns, optimal auctions are fully … transparent: every standard auction, which reveals all bids yields maximal revenue. With concave signaling concerns there is no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420461
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis …, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269
In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788