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Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems
Imai, Haruo; Salonen, Hannu - 2009
We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503005
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Reciprocal preferences in matching markets
Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023 - This version: February 2023
paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421
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Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
Bester, Helmut - 2021
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
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Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
Bester, Helmut - 2021
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
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Everyone likes to be liked : experimental evidence from matching markets
Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023
Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792
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Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023
Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372
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Implementation with farsighted agents
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2021
that the class of implementable social choice rules in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093
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Mutually Best Matches
Salonen, Hannu; Salonen, Mikko A.A. - 2016
individually rational matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. If preferences satisfy … matching. These properties guarantee also that the student proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading … Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503062
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Congestion, Coordination and Matching
Halko, Marja-Liisa; Salonen, Hannu - 2008
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite congestion and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502982
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A Cluster and a Search Market CanCoexist
Virrankoski, Juha - 2019
I examine a rational expectations model of buyers and capacity con-strained sellers, where traders can choose between a cluster and a searchmarket. Sellers choose a market and post a price, and then buyerschoose which market to visit. There is a pure strategy equilibriumwhere all agents are in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503081