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Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider
Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2020
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012255849
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Sweet lemons : mitigating collusion in organizations
Pollrich, Martin; Negenborn, Colin von - 2018
possible. To implement a given SCF we propose a one-sided mechanism that endogenously creates private information for the … mechanism all collusive side-bargaining fails, similar to the trade failure in Akerlof's (1970) car market and in models of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729
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Exit options and the allocation of authority
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
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Monetizing digital content with network effects : a mechanism-design approach
Meisner, Vincent; Pillath, Pascal - 2024
We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and nonrival good with network effects. Buyers have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015064213
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems : a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
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Habit formation and the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods
Aronsson, Thomas; Schöb, Ronnie - 2017
This paper examines the implications of habit formation in private and public consumption for the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods, based on a two-period model with nonlinear taxation. If the public good supply is time-invariant, the presence of habit formation generally alters the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587590
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The ratchet effect in social dilemmas
Gallier, Carlo; Sturm, Bodo - 2020
In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012196294
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Individual differences and contribution sequences in threshold public goods
Schüssler, Katharina; Schüßler, Michael; Mühlbauer, … - 2018
-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900072
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Motivate the crowd or crowd- them out? : the impact of local government spending on the voluntary provision of a green public good
Bartels, Lara; Kesternich, Martin - 2022
Cities are increasingly hold accountable for climate action. By demonstrating their proenvironmentality through own climate-related activities, they not at least aspire to encourage individual climate protection efforts. Based on standard economic theory there is little reason to assume that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013399851
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Collective minimum contributions to counteract the ratchet effect in the voluntary provision of public goods
Alt, Marius; Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2022 - This version: November, 2022
We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The … ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time … mechanism that stipulates all agents to contribute at least a collective minimum to the public good which is based on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460308