Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...

Simple life cycle and permanent income hypotheses imply that changes in consumption should be unforecastable. Rational forward-looking agents ought to smooth consumption over the life cycle and exhaust the asset stock accumulated during the working career in retirement. Empirical observations...

The creation and effects of social capital have seldom been a target for systematic analysis in orthodox economics. The purpose of the paper is to argue that in order to include social capital, along with physical and human, into economic analysis, we have to regard human preferences as...

We show that whenever a decision maker reasons about an optimal decision he is able to find one, even with non-transitive preferences. The existence of a reasoning process allows him to strategically manipulate how he reasons. A reasoning strategy that is robust against (finite) deviations is...

Social institutions are persistent regularities in contracting and other relations amongst men and in the unintended consequences of such rule-like behavior. They include morality and law as well as institutions of governance such as branding and advertising. Institutions are studied in all...

Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our...

The availability of quantity information along with expenditure information in some household surveys allows the estimation of price reactions on the basis of unit values. We compare two specifications that have been proposed in this context by Deaton (1990) and Crawford et al. (1997) in order...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

Many budget surveys present the interesting features that for a wide range of goods they contain quantity information along with expenditure information, and that the geographical location of households is fairly precise. We take advantage of these features to develop a method for estimation of...

We analyze competition on nonlinear prices in homogeneous goods markets with consumer search. In equilibrium firms offer two-part tariffs consisting of a linear price and lump-sum fee. The equilibrium production is socially efficient as the linear price of equilibrium two-part tariffs equals to...