Showing 1 - 10 of 3,066
This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000892990
In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients in a … treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician (but not the patient) knows the appropriate treatment, and even … after consulting, the patient is not sure whether he got proper treatment or got an unnecessary treatment, i.e. was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413597
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626592
We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053483
This paper aims at providing business survey analysts with simple econometric tools to quantify qualitative survey data. We extend the traditional and commonly applied method proposed by Carlson and Parkin (1975) to capture observable survey respondent heterogeneity. We also discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001531547
This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001604531