This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …

We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining … periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods …

We study a Baron-Ferejohn (1989) type of bargaining model to which we append an investment stage. As long as no … accept it. Prior to the bargaining stage, players may make investments to increase their recognition probabili- ties in the … bargaining game. The investment stage is modeled in the standard way, first suggested by Tullock (1980). When investment costs …

experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game … and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments. …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes … in isolated bilateral bargaining. …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes … in isolated bilateral bargaining. …

criteria change the fiscal bargaining situation on the national level? For this purpose, a bargaining game between a national …

We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982 …) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is … bargaining delay is negligible (frequent offers, so dynamic consistency holds by design), while payoff delay is significant (a …