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Split-award auctions and supply disruptions

Fugger, Nicolas; Laitenberger, Ulrich - 2020 - This version: December 21, 2020

that might fail to deliver. The buyer conducts a procurement auction to determine contract suppliers and can choose between … plays an important role in procurement practice but attracted little attention in the academic analysis of procurement … auctions. Academic research on multi-sourcing procurement auction typically analyzes these auctions as stand-alone events. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012388963

Political adverse selection

Bursztyn, Leonardo; Kolstad, Jonathan; Rao, Aakaash; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332490

Safe but fragile : information acquisition, sponsor support and shadow bank runs

König, Philipp Johann; Pothier, David - 2018

This paper proposes a theory of shadow bank runs in the presence of sponsor liquidity support. We show that liquidity lines designed to insulate shadow banks from market and funding liquidity risk can be destabilizing, as they provide them with incentives to acquire private information about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855308

Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement

Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin - 2019

We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105726

Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes

Decarolis, Francesco; Giuﬀrida, Leonardo; Iossa, … - 2019

question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134471

Project monitoring and banking competition under adverse selection

Kanniainen, Vesa; Stenbacka, Rune - 1998 - Revised version

We develop an analysis of ex ante monitoring of risky projects in banking. If protected from competition, banks are more concerned about not catching good risk projects when the perceived state of the economy improves, while they are more concerned about being induced to finance bad risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417798