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We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and nonrival good with network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an endogenous number of the highest types shares consumption, and we provide an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015064213
While increasingly popular in many domains crowdfunding remains largely un-derresearched and little is known about the best way to encourage participation. In a field experiment we vary suggested amounts and test different wordings for a campaign to finance a club good - an institute's summer...
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than predicted coordination in centralized organizations. We show that the observed deviations disappear when uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872542
coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In … coordination between group members, both leading to lower payoffs. However, these results depend strongly on the group's gender …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285502
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A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the observability of charities' location such that each donor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105442
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012255849