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Markets for leaked information
Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2015 - November 2015
We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380192
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Markets for leaked information
Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2016 - (Revised February 2016)
We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011433634
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An information metric of similarity of expectations
Cotter, Kevin D. - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003518841
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Selling certification of private and market information
Celik, Gorkem; Strausz, Roland - 2024
We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053483
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Communicating preferences to improve recommendations
Habibi, Amir - 2023
) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014479178
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Aggregate information and organizational structures
Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2018
We study an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determine the organization's aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents' private information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011904801
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Aggregate information and organizational structures
Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2022
We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents' private information may induce the principal to manipulate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476692
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Spin doctors : an experiment on vague disclosure
Deversi, Marvin; Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter - 2021
Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. Our theory-driven laboratory experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191455
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Signaling versus costly information acquisition
Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
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Inattention and the taxation bias
Boccanfuso, Jérémy; Ferey, Antoine - 2022 - This version: August 2021
This paper shows that agent inattention to taxes generates a time-inconsistency problem in the choice of tax policy. In … equilibrium, inattention leads to inefficiently high tax rates and a taxation bias emerges. Combining structural and sufficient …. Overall, our findings shed new light on the policy and welfare implications of inattention and misperceptions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013193793