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acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and … paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421
Every year during school and college admissions, students and their parents devote considerable time and effort to acquiring costly information about their own preferences. In a market where students are ranked by universities based on exam scores, we explore ways to reduce wasteful information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500709
the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486890
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013272108
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013347263
We construct a dynamic model of two-sided sorting in labor markets with multi-dimensional agent and firm heterogeneity. We apply it to study optimal party structure and the decision of how (de)centralized candidate recruitment should be. Parties are non-unitary actors and compete at the local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229853
In a symmetric repeated game with standard preferences, there are no gains from intertemporal trade. In fact, under a suitable normalization of utility, the payoff set in the repeated game is identical to that in the stage game. We show that this conclusion may no longer be true if preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236822