Showing 1 - 10 of 15
This chapter presents a microeconomic, behavioral perspective on bounded rationality and beliefs. It begins with an account of how research on belief biases, in particular via probabilistic belief elicitation, has become mainstream in economics only relatively recently and late, even in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014521135
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191479
We repeatedly elicit beliefs about the returns to study effort in a panel survey of students of a large university course. A behavioral model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and malleable beliefs yields the prediction that the dynamics of return beliefs mirrors the importance of exerting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930658
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012266524
Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033566
Understanding discrimination is key for designing policy interventions that promote equality in society. Economists have studied the topic intensively, typically taxonomizing discrimination as either taste-based or (accurate) statistical discrimination. To enrich this taxonomy, we design a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012261854
We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends on whether the agent's (verifiable) presentation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014445155
We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive concerns with material bandwagoning incentives, and we show that comparative statics in salience...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014445156
This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505325