I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises...

This chapter presents a microeconomic, behavioral perspective on bounded rationality and beliefs. It begins with an account of how research on belief biases, in particular via probabilistic belief elicitation, has become mainstream in economics only relatively recently and late, even in...

Understanding discrimination is key for designing policy interventions that promote equality in society. Economists have studied the topic intensively, typically taxonomizing discrimination as either taste-based or (accurate) statistical discrimination. To reveal the limitations of this taxonomy...

We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...

Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate...

We repeatedly elicit beliefs about the returns to study effort in a panel survey of students of a large university course. A behavioral model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and malleable beliefs yields the prediction that the dynamics of return beliefs mirrors the importance of exerting...

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...

This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of...

Using novel time-use data from Germany before and after reunification, we document two facts: First, spouses who both work full-time exhibit similar housework patterns whether they do so voluntarily or due to a full-time mandate, as in the GDR. Second, men's amount of housework is independent of...

Understanding discrimination is key for designing policy interventions that promote equality in society. Economists have studied the topic intensively, typically taxonomizing discrimination as either taste-based or (accurate) statistical discrimination. To enrich this taxonomy, we design a...