We challenge the standard definition of economic rationality as consistency by making use of a novel distinction between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency...

Behavioral economics has so far largely avoided discussing the psychological origins of preferences, as well as their relation to needs. This has not only restricted interdisciplinary exchange, but also significantly limits the predictive capabilities of models. For example, the revealed...

Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms....

Current time allocation and household production models face three major weaknesses: First, they only describe the average time allocation. Thus, information about the order of activities is lost. Therefore, it is impossible to describe the influence of activities on later ones. Such...

Loss aversion postulates that people prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of equal size. It is a central part of prospect theory and, according to Daniel Kahneman, “the most significant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 300). It has powerful...

We describe a new mechanism - what we call a booster draft - for allocating multiple, indivisible objects among a group of individuals. The mechanism’s appeal lies in its strategy-proofness and simplicity: Individuals take turns drawing objects from different sets - called boosters - and...