externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory (super …- visory) decision of which banks are to be shut down before they can go bankrupt, and (ii) a bailout decision of who pays for … decentralized way. In our benchmark model the two countries always agree on a centralized regulation policy. In contrast, bailout …

sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a …How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this … question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times …

sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a …How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this … question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times …

, depositors, and regulators in connection with bank insolvency may corrupt banks' credit allocation and monitoring decisions … potential endogeneity which are usually inherent to research into the real economic implications of bank regulation. We find a … dependent on bank financing. Our findings are robust to various specifications. Investigating the transmission channels of the …

CCyB, especially relative to countries where a bank regulator or the central bank has the authority to set the CCyB. While …