Using a simple sign test, we report new empirical evidence, taken from both the US and the German stock markets, showing that trading behavior substantially changed around Black Monday in 1987. It turned out that before Black Monday investors behaved more as in the momentum strategy; and after...

In this paper we show that informational and real frictions in CDS markets strongly affect CDS premia. We derive this main finding using a proprietary set of individual CDS transactions cleared by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. We first show that CDS traders adjust the CDS premium...

We show that a common (identical across investors) irrationality in information processing can be enough to create nontrivial trade, using one of standard partial-equilibrium environments. We can attribute this trade to their common irrationality because we strip the investors and their...

We show that the excessive use of hidden orders causes artificial price pressures and abnormal asset returns. Using a simple game-theoretical setting, we demonstrate that this effect naturally arises from mis-coordination in trading schedules between traders, when suppliers of liquidity do not...

We use a model with agency frictions to analyze the structure of a dealer market that faces competition from a crossing network. Traders are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios), which is something the dealer must take into account when engaging his counterparties....

One explanation for overpricing on asset markets is a lack of traders' self-control. Self-control is the individual capacity to override or inhibit undesired impulses that may drive prices. We implement the first experiment to address the causal relationship between self-control abilities and...

We consider an optimal liquidation model in which an investor is required to execute meta-orders during intraday trading periods, and his trading activity triggers child orders and endogenously affects future order flow, both instantaneously and permanently. Under the assumptions of risk...

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...