certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information …-maximal information-gathering. Thus, optimal contracts eliminate private information but not market uncertainty; even though the latter … would be costless, it is suboptimal as it requires excessive information rents to the seller. Thus, market inefficiencies …

) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences …

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed … information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an … adverse sorting effect, allocating the information to those types of third parties who harm the agent most. In equilibrium …

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed … information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an … adverse sorting effect, allocating the information to those types of third parties who harm the agent most. In equilibrium …

diffusion via word-of-mouth communication leads to some consumers free-riding on their “friends” and less information …Consumers can acquire information through their own search efforts or through their social network. Information …

' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information …

Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one … stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show …

with incentives to acquire private information about their assets' type. This can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry …-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces shadow …

contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening … framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain partially uninformed, since such an information structure induces the seller to … set low prices. For the optimal information signal, trade is efficient, and the seller only extracts the static monopoly …