Banks in bad financial shape are more likely to appoint executive directors from the outside than those in good shape. It is, however, not clear whether all of these appointments necessarily lead to the desired turnaround. We analyze the performance effects of new board members with external...

This paper deals with stress tests for credit risk and shows how exploiting the discretion when setting up and implementing a model can drive the results of a quantitative stress test for default probabilities. For this purpose, we employ several variations of a CreditPortfolioView-style model...

The novel partial-use philosophy by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiates a paradigm shift for banks, allowing them to permanently partially apply the internal ratings-based approach (IRBA) and not having to fully roll it out across the overall bank anymore. This raises the...

We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze the interaction between capital adequacy regulation and credit risk transfer with credit default swaps (CDS) including its effect on lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a...

This paper studies the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic model where banks are exposed to credit and liquidity risk and can resolve financial distress in three costly forms: bond issuance, equity issuance or fire sales. We find an inverted U–shaped relationship between...

How does asset encumbrance affect the fragility of intermediaries subject to rollover risk? We offer a model in which a bank issues covered bonds backed by a pool of assets that is bankruptcy remote and replenished following losses. Encumbering assets allows a bank to raise cheap secured debt...

M-PRESS-CreditRisk is a new top-down macro stress testing framework that can help supervisors gauge banks' capital adequacy related to credit risk. For the first time, it combines calibration of microprudential capital requirements and macroprudential buffers in a unified, coherent framework....

We develop a model of bank risk-taking with strategic sovereign default risk. Domestic banks invest in real projects and purchase government bonds. While an increase in bond purchases crowds out profitable investments, it improves the government's incentives to repay and therefore lowers its...

A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. We study these...

We investigate how banks' capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bankspecific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bankspecific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the...