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Information frictions and adverse selection : policy interventions in health insurance markets
Handel, Benjamin R.; Kolstad, Jonathan; Spinnewijn, Johannes - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410579
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Project monitoring and banking competition under adverse selection
Kanniainen, Vesa; Stenbacka, Rune - 1998 - Revised version
We develop an analysis of ex ante monitoring of risky projects in banking. If protected from competition, banks are … optimal ex ante monitoring of good risks, but is too conservative with regard to bad risks. Competition between banks is shown … Wettbewerb geschützt werden, dann legen sie unter guten wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen mehr Wert darauf sich keine Projekte mit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417798
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Heterogeneity, demand for insurance and adverse selection
Spinnewijn, Johannes - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009746110
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On a caratheodory-type selection theorem
Kim, Taesung; Prikry, Karel; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 1985
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003528287
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Optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard
Prescott, Edward C.; Townsend, Robert M. - 1981
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003528961
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Sequential versus static screening : an equivalence result
Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2017
We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626592
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Dynamic screening
Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014320919
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Dynamic screening with verifiable bankruptcy
Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2022
We consider a dynamic screening model where the agent may go bankrupt due to, for example, cash constraints. We model bankruptcy as a verifiable event that occurs whenever the agent makes a per period loss. This leads to less stringent truth-telling constraints than those considered in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476119
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Product market competition, creative destruction and innovation
Griffith, Rachel; Van Reenen, John - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012696147