We investigate the relationship between bank complexity and bank risk-taking using German banking data over the period 2005-2017. We find that more complex banking organizations tend to take on more risk, but that this complexity-risk nexus decreases over time. We study how regulatory...

We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because political and fiscal costs undermine supervisors' commitment to intervene. When supervisors have lower credibility,...

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is...

We study how contingent capital affects banks' risk choices. When triggered in highly levered states, going-concern conversion reduces risk-taking incentives, unlike conversion at default by traditional bail-inable debt. Interestingly, contingent capital (CoCo) may be less risky than bail-inable...

In this paper, we examine the international transmission of monetary policies of major advanced economies (US, UK, euro area) through banks in Austria and Germany. In particular, we compare the role of banks’ funding structure, broken down by country of origin as well as by currency...

We investigate the transmission of changes in bank capital requirements and supranational monetary policy, and their interaction effect, on euro area bank lending and lending rates. Our results show that - for weakly capitalized banks - increases in capital requirements are in the short-run...