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An information metric of similarity of expectations

Cotter, Kevin D. - 1983

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003518841

Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2015 - November 2015

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380192

Markets for leaked information

Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2016 - (Revised February 2016)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011433634

Selling certification of private and market information

Celik, Gorkem; Strausz, Roland - 2024

We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053483

Algorithmic advice as a credence good

Biermann, Jan; Horton, John J.; Walter, Johannes - 2022

Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013499021

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774

Why do people pay for useless advice?

Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes Eko - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009554805

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2013

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the … dieser Innovation durch jeden Experten erfolgt auf der Grundlage dessen, was in der gemeinsamen Disziplin als allgemein …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195361

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162

Information nudges and self-control

Mariotti, Thomas; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora; … - 2018

We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931537

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