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The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The present paper analyzes data from a novel...
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We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191476
Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker’s normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305744
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this … necessary for implementation under rational behavior, with non-rational behavior it is neither. In this paper we investigate … behavioral implementation under complete information without assuming Unanimity. Moreover, we give a full characterization of …
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Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014481063
We study preferences over procedures in the presence of naive agents. We employ a school choice setting following Pathak and Sönmez (2008) who show that sophisticated agents are better off under the Boston mechanism than under a strategy-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539