We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high...

We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout...

In this paper we apply conjoint analysis as an empirical method to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on the perceived tax burden. As reference for the individual behavior we use the model of a rational utility maximizer described by the economic theory. We determine a...

Who benefits from the evasion of value added taxes (VAT)? Using a reform that enforced VAT on previously non-compliant large retailers in Armenia, we estimate a onethird passthrough of the tax burden on prices. This suggests that pre-enforcement evasion rents were broadly shared with consumers...

We study the welfare effects of combining the European Commission's proposal for VAT harmonization with different degrees of weakening of the 'quotient familial' , a feature of the French system of direct taxation which can be interpreted as aiming at taxing 'equivalised' household income. We...

This paper explores the connection between the proliferation of cashless, or e-money, payments and value-added tax (VAT) compliance. We present both visual and descriptive evidence that illustrates a negative correlation between e-money use and VAT evasion, proxied by the VAT compliance gap for...