This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …

the principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and …

experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game …