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-side price mechanisms in health insurance design work similarly for low-income and higher-income individuals. We also find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440053
stylized way, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician. Medical … overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and … adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413597
the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician, including observability of … whether he was perhaps overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients … found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490343
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818352
In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This study develops a theoretical framework with which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012661468
This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012671879
This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
Political parties play a crucial gatekeeping role in elections, including controlling electoral resources, candidate recruitment, and electoral list compositions. In making these strategic choices, parties aim to encourage candidates to invest in the campaign, while also trying to secure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014465029