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The identification of key players in a terrorist network can lead to prevention of attacks, due to efficient allocation of surveillance means or isolation of key players in order to destabilize the network. In this paper we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist...
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The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372977
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372987
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373812
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378792
In this paper we focus on restrictions arising from the players belonging to some hierarchical structure that is represented by a digraph. Two of these models are the games with a permission structure and games under precedence constraints. In both cases, the hierarchy can be represented by a...
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In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590400