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Many important economic situations can be modelled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. Of special interest is the question of the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which actions are monotonic in types. In this paper, we...
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Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re-quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con-dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule...
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Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of factoring. We define a new notion of bounded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921734
In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221860
I consider a flexible framework of strategic interactions under incomplete information in which, prior to committing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to an arbitrarily large number of information sources about the primitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476378
A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003781447
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099