Showing 51 - 58 of 58
We consider an environment with a single divisible good and two bidders. The valuations of the bidders are private information but one bidder has a commonly known budget constraint. For this environment we derive the revenue maximizing subsidy free incentive compatible auction. We also examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780883
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780887
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780890
We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780893
This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779217
This paper formalizes a widely discussed peer effect entitled 'acting white'. 'Acting White' is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary: signals that induce highe wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection. Without peer effects, the equilibrium involve all ability types choosing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779282
This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779300
Government procurement and allocation programs often use subsidies and setasides favoring small businesses and other target groups to address fairness concerns. These concerns are in addition to standard objectives such as efficiency and revenue. We study the design of the optimal mechanism for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009534119