Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to … disclosing sensitive private information like other students' preferences or school priorities. In particular, we show that the …"); or (2) using "predictable" preference elicitation procedures that convey rich "experiential" information. In our main …

The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two …-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by … the agents, on the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome, as well as on the distribution of utility. …

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi … immediately. These results and direct survey evidence are consistent with a model of information acquisition: it is costly for …