on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …

unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching. …

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically …A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching … facilitates match formation. -- Matching Markets ; Signaling …