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Executive compensation and stock options : an inconvenient truth

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003740959

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

Executive compensation : six questions that need answering

Abowd, John M.; Kaplan, David Scott - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001388180

Catching hipo's : screening, wages and unemployment

Janssen, Maarten C. W. - 2000

, therefore,says that a firm sets higher wages, the higher unemployment. As themodel is applicable tothe upper segment of the …In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I … show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303310