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Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2013
and allocations. -- asking prices ; competing mechanism design ; auctions with entry ; competitive search …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696885
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Flow Trading
Budish, Eric B.; Cramton, Peter C.; Kyle, Albert S.; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
-linear demand curves with quantities as flows (shares/second). Batch auctions clear all asset markets jointly in discrete time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250116
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Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016
be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476548
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Procurement with unforeseen contingencies
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011770710
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"Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2015
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407823
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Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2014
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010387737
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Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957
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Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending
Blickle, Kristian; He, Zhiguo; Huang, Jing; Parlatore, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486246
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The Bidder Exclusion Effect
Coey, Dominic - 2014
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458142
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Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement : An Empirical Analysis
Bajari, Patrick - 2003
this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of … potential limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is … incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions stifle communication between buyers and the sellers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468941