Narrow search
Showing 51 - 60 of 175
Cover Image
Simulation and estimation of hedonic models
Heckman, James J. (contributor); Matzkin, Rosa (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784172
Cover Image
Identification and estimation of hedonic models
Ekeland, Ivar (contributor); Heckman, James J. (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784295
Cover Image
City structure, job search and labour discrimination, theory and policy implications
Selod, Harris; Zenou, Yves - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002816486
Cover Image
City structure, job search and labour discrimination : theory and policy implications
Selod, Harris; Zenou, Yves - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002647095
Cover Image
Efficiency wages and unemployment in cities : the case of high relocation costs
Zenou, Yves - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001797040
Cover Image
Who's who in crime networks : wanted - the key player
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002123916
Cover Image
Fiscal policy in an overlapping generations model with bequest-as-consumption
Michel, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre - In: Journal of public economic theory 6 (2004) 3, pp. 397-407
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002359585
Cover Image
Jointly optimal taxes and enforecement policies in response to tax evasion
Pestieau, Pierre; Possen, Uri M.; Slutsky, Steven Myles - In: Journal of public economic theory 6 (2004) 2, pp. 337-374
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002196986
Cover Image
Fiscal policy with agents differing in altruism and in ability
Michel, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002006129
Cover Image
Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831247