Similar Search Results

Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance - Independent Directors, Non-Executive Chairs, and the Importance of the Devil's Advocate

Morck, Randall - 2004

The Common Law, parliamentary democracy, and academia all institutionalize dissent to check undue obedience to authority; and corporate governance reformers advocate the same in boardrooms. Many corporate governance disasters could often be averted if directors asked hard questions, demanded...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468049

Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?

Morck, Randall - 1989

the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies …, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition …. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476048

CEO Pay and the rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?

Bell, Brian - 2016

responds more to increases in shareholders' return performance than to decreases. Further, this asymmetry is stronger when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456270

CEO pay and the rise of relative performance contracts : a question of governance?

Bell, Brian; Van Reenen, John - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524397

Corporate Governance, Business Group Governance and Economic Development Traps

Dau, Luis - 2020

Every firm in a developed economy relies on the mere existence of countless other firms to keep prices competitive up and down all supply chains. Without this network externality, no firm forms; and without many firms, no network forms; locking in a low-income trap. Business group governance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482288

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

Morck, Randall - 2010

Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462167

Never Waste a Good Crisis : An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance

Morck, Randall - 2009

Different economies at different times use different institutional arrangements to constrain the people entrusted with allocating the economy's capital and other resources. Comparative financial histories show these corporate governance regimes to be largely stable through time, but capable of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463607

Innocents Abroad : The Hazards of International Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms

Perkins, Susan - 2008

that assign officers and directors a duty to act for their business group, not their firm or its shareholders. Even where a … duty to individual firms' shareholders exists, business groups often have pyramidal structures of intercorporate … blockholdings that entrench controlling shareholders, usually wealthy families, who run their groups to maximize their utility. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464733

When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance

Faleye, Olubunmi - 2005

Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467431

Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth

Morck, Randall - 2004

agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467999