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Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Coles, Peter - 2010

on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462472

An incentive theory of matching

Brown, Alessio J. G.; Merkl, Christian; Snower, Dennis J. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848271

Productivity in cities : self-selection and sorting

Venables, Anthony - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746881

Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a Matching Model

Rotemberg, Julio J. - 2008

This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers by posting vacancies. Firms act monopsonistically and set wages to retain their existing workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in that its assumptions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464892

Mismatch

Shimer, Robert - 2005

This paper develops a dynamic model of mismatch. Workers and jobs are randomly assigned to labor markets. Each labor market clears at each instant but some labor markets have more workers than jobs, hence unemployment, and some have more jobs than workers, hence vacancies. As workers and jobs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466783

Wages and Informality in Developing Countries

Meghir, Costas - 2012

It is often argued that informal labor markets in developing countries promote growth by reducing the impact of regulation. On the other hand informality may reduce the amount of social protection offered to workers. We extend the wage-posting framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to allow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460313