responds more to increases in shareholders' return performance than to decreases. Further, this asymmetry is stronger when …

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution … of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal … responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand …

In this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality. We analyze the hospital sector where … management quality - measured using a new survey tool - is strongly correlated with financial and clinical outcomes such as … a greater number of neighboring hospitals) is positively correlated with increased management quality, and this …

-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts written by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares …. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …