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same agency problem. We show that, in general, the shareholders' and the manager's capital structure choices differ not …
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In this paper I argue that corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical applications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm. I also argue that while the existing theories have delivered very important and useful insights, they seem to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471055
We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999-2002. This setting offers us three ideal conditions for such a study: plenty of corporate governance violations, no alternative mechanisms to address them, and the presence of an investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466140
This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467710
In this paper we discuss the role of the media in pressuring corporate managers and directors to behave in ways that … are 'socially acceptable'. Sometimes this coincides with shareholders' value maximization, others not. We provide both … resources that are diverted to the sole advantage of controlling shareholders. Our results have important consequences for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469397
governance must shift from alleviating the agency problems between managers and shareholders to studying mechanisms that give the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470778