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Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato - 2015
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459057
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Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition
Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato - 2018
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival’s exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011804767
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Collusion in repeated procurement auction : a study of a paving market in Japan
Ishii, Rieko (contributor) - 2008
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720842
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Clustered bids in first-price auctions : collusion or competition?
Leverano, Adriano de - In: Economics letters 233 (2023), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014506238
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Auctions for public construction with corner-cutting
Akai, Kenju; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2009
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921749
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An experimental study of Japanese procurement auctions with endogenous minimum prices
Akai, Kenju; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2009
Several Japanese local governments started to add endogenous minimum prices to firstprice auctions in their public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921759
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Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2014
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of … the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit … first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362953
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The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Mikami, Ryo; Sakai, Toyotaka; … - 2020
We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321709
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A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698
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Market concentration and incentives to collude in Cournot oligopoly experiments
Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Masiliūnas, Aidas - 2021
higher rates of aggregate collusion in markets with fewer firms are driven by the changes in incentives or focality rather … than purely the number of firms. These findings imply that antitrust policies aimed at preventing collusion should focus on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012501283