Showing 1 - 10 of 12
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308439
applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468067
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674856
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009271960
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702275
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457
This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity-dependent treatment on … incentive provision in contests and their optimal design. For instance, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of leveling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415462
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415617
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306
This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695002