Showing 1 - 10 of 38
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674856
This note studies the allocation of heterogeneous commodities to agents whose private values for combinations of these commodities are monotonic by inclusion. This setting can accommodate the presence of complementarity and substitutability among the heterogeneous commodities. By using induction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002718515
We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of (consumption) bundles. We assume that preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880250
The paradoxical full-surplus-extraction (FE) result, which can impair the mechanism design paradigm, is a long-standing concern in the literature. We tackle this problem by experimentally testing the performance of an FE auction, which is a second-price (2P) auction with lotteries. In the FE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015141891
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921749
Several Japanese local governments started to add endogenous minimum prices to firstprice auctions in their public procurements. Any bid less than the endogenous minimum price is referred to as abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement procedure. The endogenous minimum price is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921759
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921779
The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari”, where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981887
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981964
We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u (x, y), where x ? [0, ?) and y ? {0, 1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the following problem....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655780