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Reputation concerns in risky experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2019

We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024759

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

The Market for liars : reputation and auditor honesty

McLennan, Andrew (contributor); Park, In-Uck (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a “two-tier equilibrium” in which “reputable …” auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while “disreputable” auditors accept bribes because … even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001783349

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear common-tiered-object preferences : characterization of minimum price rule

Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2016

We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477603

Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects

Tajika, Tomoya; Kazumura, Tomoya - 2016

We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known thatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477617

Matching platforms

Aoyagi, Masaki; Yoo, Seung Han - 2019

A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012137080

A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : an experiment for the Vickrey auction

Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019

We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698

Bertrand competition under network externalities

Aoyagi, Masaki - 2017

Two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good. When the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions, we identify...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617912

Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645220

Mechanism design without quasilinearity

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657364