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Beniers, Klaas J.; Swank, Otto H. - 2003

This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-makingprocesses in a world where agents must …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332816

Environmental policy choice under uncertainty

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - 2003

Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firmsto adopt new technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a directtechnology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costsof technological advances...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333273

Do elections lead to informed public decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365

Policy makers, advisors, and reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334827

Polarization, information collection and electoral control

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334829

A simple model of self-assessments

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H. - 2006

We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348342

The self-perception theory vs. a dynamic learning model

Swank, Otto H. - 2006

motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The … crux of this theory is that people remember their past decisions and the extrinsic rewards they received, but they do not … recall their intrinsic motives. In this paper I show that the SP theory can be modeled as a variant of a conventional dynamic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349711

Producing and manipulating information : private information providers versus public information providers

Dur, Robert A. J.; Swank, Otto H. - 2001

This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316863

How polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - 2001

In a multiperiod setting, decision-makers can learn about the consequences of their decisions throughexperimentation. In this paper we examine how in a two-party system polarization and political instability affectlearning through experimentation. We distinguish two cases:the decision to be made...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316875

Deliberation, information aggregation and collective decision making

Swank, Otto H.; Wrasai, Phongthorn - 2003

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325966