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Emotions and economic shocks in a first-price auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333886
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Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk
Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2023
bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition reduces the informativeness of the price requests and weakens the anchoring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299618
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Competitive bidding in auctions with private and common values
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - 2000
uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303293
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Trading places : an experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing
Haji, Anouar El; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that determine the sequence of service to queued customers. In the server-initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the queue and distributes the proceeds among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532591
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Auctioning incentive contracts : an experimental study
Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur van de - 2009
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379431
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Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2004
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342575
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Keeping out Trojan horses : auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
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Money talks? : an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money
Haan, Thomas de; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2011
We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386442
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Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van - 2018
We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
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Efficiency in auctions with private and common values : an experimental study
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - 2000
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information … motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the winner's curse, they weigh their private and common value information in … reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency. The public release of information about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303292